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Abstract
The regret matching algorithm proposed by Sergiu Hart is one of the
most powerful iterative methods in finding correlated equilibrium. How-
ever, it is possibly not efficient enough, especially in large scale problems.
We first rewrite the algorithm in a computationally practical way based
on the idea of the regret matrix. Moreover, the rewriting makes the orig-
inal algorithm more easy to understand. Then by some modification to
the original algorithm, we introduce a novel variant, namely faster regret
matching. The experiment result shows that the novel algorithm has a
speed advantage comparing to the original one.
1 Introduction
1.1 Game
Game theory is a well-studied discipline that analysis situations of competition
and cooperation between several involved players. It has a tremendous appli-
cation in many areas, such as economic, warfare strategic, cloud computing.
Furthermore, there are some studies about using the game theory to interpret
machine learning model in recent years [1, 2].
One of the milestones in game theory [3, 4, 5] is, John von Neumann proved
the famous minimax theorem for zero-sum games and showed that there is a
stable equilibrium point for a two-player zero-sum game [6]. Later, another
pioneer, John Nash proved that, at every n-player general sum game with a
finite number of actions for each player, there must exist at least one Nash
equilibrium.
We now give a formal math definition of a game. Let Γ =
(
N,
(
Si
)
i∈N ,
(
ui
)
i∈N
)
be a finite action N-person game. N is players set. Si is the set of actions of
player i. In this paper, we consider pure strategy s ∈ S particularly, which
means each player chooses one action only. ui : S → R is the payoff function
of player i, and, in the two-person finite action case, the payoff function of one
player is a matrix with size |S1| ∗ |S2|. The entry in this matrix, say mij,k,
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means the payoff value of player i given that player one chooses action j, and
player two chooses action k. We will give more detail about the notations in
the section 1.3.
A Nash equilibrium [7, 8] of a game is a strategy profile when no player
can get more benefit by unilaterally changing his strategy. s ∈ S is a Nash
equilibrium, such that for each i, it satisfies
ui(s) ≥ ui(si = k; s−i),∀k ∈ Si. (1)
1.2 Correlated equilibrium
Robert Aumann originally presents a solution concept called correlated equilib-
rium [9, 10, 11]. It is more general than the well known Nash equilibrium. The
correlated equilibrium is a public recommend strategy giving to each player. If
every player gains no benefit of deviation, we say this recommend strategy a
correlated equilibrium. The formal math definition is given below. If for every
i ∈ N , every j, k ∈ Si, a probability distribution ψ satisfy:∑
s∈S:si=j
ψ(s)
[
ui
(
k, s−i
)− ui(s)] ≤ α, (2)
then the ψ is a correlated α-equilibrium. Moreover, if α = 0, ψ is a correlated
equilibrium. Instead of finding the Nash equilibrium of a game, in this paper,
we want to find the correlated equilibrium.
1.3 Notation
In general, we use superscript to denote player index and subscript to denote
time. Si means the action set of player i, and it contains |Si| numbers of
elements. S := Πi∈NSi is the set of N-tuple of pure strategy. st represents a
action profile at time t, which is a n ∗ 1 vector, and the i-th element describes
the i-th player action. s−i denote a (n − 1) ∗ 1 size pure strategy which is
exactly the same as s except the i-th player has no action, i.e., s−i =
(
si
′
)
i′ 6=i
.
We denote si = k; s−i a pure strategy, which is the same as s except the i-th
player choose action k. This notation is widely used in the following chapter.
ui :
∏
i∈N S
i → R is the player i payoff function.
1.4 Contributions
Our contribution of this paper is threefold.
• We bring up the concept of regret matrix, making the original algorithm
more easy to implement and understand.
• We propose a variant of the regret matching by utilizing the negative
part of the regret values. This novel algorithm is possibly faster than the
original one.
2
• We develop an experiment to analyze both the original algorithm and the
variant
2 Rewriting the regret matching in a computa-
tionally friendly way
The whole algorithm base on the adaptive procedure named regret matching
proposed by Sergiu [12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Indeed, we rewrite the method
of Sergiu in a computationally friendly way. The whole algorithm is essentially
the same as regret matching, and it does hold the great convergence guarantee.
The first point to make is the separated player updating rule. Each player has
its own payoff function ui, and the algorithm does not require any knowledge
about other player’s payoff functions. It updates its own regret-matrix and
deriving probability distribution from it. That is, each player has completely
nothing to deal with other players. The algorithm explained below is built on
some fixed player i and some fixed time t, and it can extend to all the other
players i and time t.
We can now give a brief introduction to the algorithm. At the time t, player
i in the game wants to find the probability distributionpit of its action setS
i,
which will control the player action choice at the next time t+1. The probability
distribution is derived from the regret-matrixRi. So at time t, after receiving
the payoff value, each player updates its regret-matrix base on the payoff value,
and the regret-matrix subsequently infer a probability distribution controlling
the next action.
Each player holds a so-called regret-matrix. The regret-matrix Ri is a |Si| ∗
|Si| size matrix, where |Si| is the action set size of player i. The entry rj,k of
regret-matrix Ri represents the regret value up to the present time t, i.e., if
the player i changes the action j, which was played in the past, to the action
k, how much more can it obtain. The subscript j means the action player i
chose at time t and the other subscript k means the player i switch action j
to action k in the whole playing history up to time t. At the time t, we fix a
row rj corresponded to the action j we have chosen in the last period, and the
matrix updating operation and the probability distribution deriving operation
are all happening in this rj row. Note that all the diagonal elements in the
regret-matrix are zero because nothing will change if you change action j to
action j itself.
Figure 1 shows a regret-matrix example of player i with three actions. The
yellow box means that at time t player i choose the third action. So at time
t, player i exclusively care about the third row of the matrix, and both the
updating and deriving procedure happen on the third row r3. The red box
represents that player i want to replace action three by action one in the whole
history playing record. The number 5 in the red box means the player i can get
five more values if the replacing happens.
The core of the algorithm is divided into two parts, the regret-matrix up-
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Figure 1: An Regret-Matrix Example
dating, and the probability distribution deriving. Assuming the action profile is
s ∈ S, the payoff of player i at time t is uit(s). The player i uses this information
solely to update its regret-matrix, more specifically the row rj . The updating
rule is
rij,k = r
i
j,k + u
i(si = k; s)− ui(s), (3)
for all k ∈ Si.
After updating the regret-matrix Ri, the next step is how to derive a prob-
ability distribution from it. The deriving formula is deriving formula is
pit+1(k) =
1
µ
∗ 1
t
∗max{rij [k], 0}, (4)
for all k ∈ Ai and k 6= j. For pit+1(j), the formula is
pit+1(j) = 1−
∑
k∈Si:k 6=j
pit+1(k) (5)
Algorithm 1: Regret-Matching
input : Game, Initial probability distribution p0
output: Empirical playing record
for t = 0,...,T-1 do
Draw pure strategy st according to the probability distribution pt.
for each player i do
compute ui(st) for updating the regret-matrix.
update rj according to equation 3, where j = st.
derivate pit+1 from rj according to equation 4.
end
end
As mentioned above, the whole algorithm control n regret-matrix, the total
number of players, and each matrix has the size of |Si|∗|Si| corresponded to each
player i. So in total, the algorithm involves
∑
i∈N |Si|2 numbers of elements.
At each iteration,
∑
i∈N |Si| elements will change.
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3 Faster regret matching
There is an interesting fact that most learning algorithms in finding the Nash
equilibrium or correlated equilibrium use the non-negative regret value. When
generating the probability distribution, the algorithm introduced in section two
has a clip operation, which is to remove the negative part of regret leaving the
positive part only. However, the negative parts do provide valuable information
also, maybe not as much as the positive parts did. In order to accelerate the
process of finding the correlated equilibrium, we utilize the negative regret value,
leading to a potentially faster algorithm.
To be specific, we remove the max operation in equation 4 retaining the
negative regret value. Nevertheless, it will lead to the vector p in the left not
to add up to zero, so that it is not a probability distribution. To overcome this
problem, we add the softmax operation after equation 4 and remove the equation
4 because, after softmax, the vector p is naturally a probability distribution. The
softmax operation is
pit+1(k)←−
ep
i
t+1(k)∑K
j=1 e
pit+1(j)
, (6)
for every k ∈ Si.
This modification has effectively used the information of negative regret
value, and guarantee the vector p still a probability distribution. Moreover, it
makes the algorithm even more intuitive and straightforward. In the following
section, we experimentally show its efficiency.
Although this improvement provides speed increasing, however, unlike the
original algorithm, it cannot guarantee the empirical distribution converge to
correlated equilibrium. So there is a tradeoff between faster speed and conver-
gence guarantee.
4 Experiment
We conduct the experiment using the i7-9700 processor, and the whole experi-
ments are implemented in Python 3.7 and Numpy 1.16.5. The code is available
on github.com.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider a two-person general sum game, and
player one has three actions, player two has four actions. The payoff-matrix’s
elements of each player are sampled from the universal distribution ranging from
−1000 to 1000. We repeated the experiment three times. Figure 2 shows the
payoff-matrix used in the experiment.
We use the alpha value to measure the distance from the current empirical
distribution to the correlated equilibrium point. The alpha value is defined
in equation 2. When the alpha value is equal to zero, it means the empirical
distribution is a correlated equilibrium.
Let each player following the algorithm introduced in section two. The em-
pirical distribution gradually converges to correlated equilibrium. In addition,
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Figure 2: Three payoff matrices
if using the faster version of the algorithm proposed in section three, the alpha
dorp down more quickly, which verifies our analysis.
Figure 3 illustrates the learning procedure of two methods. It base on the
payoff function showed above. The total iteration number T is 1000, and we
measure the alpha value every 20 times.
Figure 3: The learning procedure of two methods
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5 Conclusion
We first review some concepts in game theory needed in this paper. Then we
rewrite the regret matching algorithm for convenient implementing and easy
understanding. The rewriting fundamentally bases on the regret-matrix. After
the rewriting, we improve the original regret matching algorithm by utilizing
the negative parts of the regret values, and the idea is intuitive and natural.
The experiment result shows the efficiency of this improvement.
Moreover, there are some interesting points worth further discussing. The
original regret matching algorithm owns the extraordinary convergence prop-
erty. However, the convergence of the new method we proposed is not guaran-
teed. We hardly find a good way to ensure the convergence, which is the limit of
our paper. Possibly good work is deeply analyzing the mechanism behind this
new method, which may find out the reason for the un-convergence problem.
Another possibly further work is using the negative parts of regret value in a
more smart way, for more speed increasing and certainly converging.
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